Reflection: The discursive approach and relevance theory

Watts (e.g. 2003) embraces relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson [1986]1995) as an explanatory framework. Mills (2003) also argues, though not uncritically, that relevance theory can make a contribution to the discursive approach (see also Christie 2007: 278–279). Given that relevance theory is a “grand” theory of universal application, this would seem a rather odd move. It has been used to account for politeness by a number of scholars (e.g. Escandell-Vidal 1996; Jary 1998; Christie 2007). In particular, relevance theory can account for the anticipated versus inferred distinction. So few cognitive effects arise from anticipated politeness (behavior following social norms) that it is not relevant enough to spend inferential effort on it; but when there are sufficiently large cognitive effects to reward processing effort, inferred politeness can take place. What makes it attractive to scholars pursuing the discursive approach is that it emphasizes the hearer and does not have generalized norms of behavior as a starting point, instead, it focuses on specific situated behaviors, “it provides an extremely powerful interpretive apparatus” (Watts 2003: 212). However, relevance theory has three problems for politeness-related studies. First, the relevance theory account of communication still involves the recognition of speakers’ intentions. It does not suit politeness to place a relatively restricted notion of intention at its centre. Second, Haugh (2003: 406) points out that the notion of cognitive effects has not been sufficiently characterized:

[T]here is no distinction made between cognitive effects which have “positive effect” (such as feelings of approval or warmth and so on), and those which have “negative effect” (such as antagonism or alienation and so on). For example, there is no distinction made between showing that one thinks well of others (which can give rise to politeness), and showing that one thinks badly of others (which can give rise to impoliteness).

Third, no publication has shown how relevance theory can produce effective analyses of stretches of naturally occurring discourse, a limitation Watts (2003: 212) concedes: “[o]ne major problem with RT is that it rarely, if ever, concerns itself with stretches of natural verbal interaction”.